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The People's Republic of China (PRC) had been a net energy exporter since 
the 1960s. In 1993, however, China became a net oil importer. Largely as a 
result of China's capitalist transition, China's thirst for energy resources has 
continued to grow massively in recent years. This is deepening the coun- 
try's energy import dependence, which in turn is changing many aspects of 
China's energy markets and accelerating China's integration with the rest of 
the world. However, with higher dependence on energy imports, particularly 
imports of oil, energy security has emerged as a top issue for the Chinese 
leadership. Indeed, the exigencies of energy security have come to influence 
the conduct of China's foreign relations. 
Thereareingeneralfour dimensionsofenergy security.Thefirst is theeconomic 
dimension. Energy security means smoothly securing adequate supplies of 
energy efficiently and at the lowest cost. This requires governments to have 
an energy policy that is transparent and reduces bamers to the efficient oper- 
ation of markets. The second is the geopolitical dimension. Promoting energy 
securitymeans that oil or energy diplomacy plays a key role inacountry's foreign 
policies. The third is the national security and military dimension. Energy 
security can be an important component in formulating a country's national 
security and defense policies. The final is the environmental dimension. To 
manage energy consumption while simultaneously protecting the environ- 
ment and avoiding ecological degradation, any country, particularly a large 
and fast growing developing country like China, faces huge challenges. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we will analyze the nature 
and seriousness of China's energy vulnerabilities, especially rising dependence 
on energy imports. Second, we will examine the economic, geopolitical, 
and, to a lesser extent, military dimensions of the dilemmas shaping China's 
energy security. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the environmental 
issues associated with energy security is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
though these issues will be touched on. 
Increasing energy needs and resulting vulnerabiities 
China is a large energy producer and more hportantly, a giant energy consumer. 
From the global perspective, China ranks second, after the United States, in total 
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energy consumption. On a per capita basis, however, China's primary energy 
consumption was nearly 30 percent below the world average in 2005. 
Coal plays a dominant role. China is the world's largest coal producer 
and consumer. In 2005, coal accounted for 70 percent of China's primary 
commercial energy consumption.' China is also the second largest oil 
consumer after the United States, though oil accounts for just under 21 percent 
of China's total primary energy consumption. 
Currently, the share of natural gas in China's primary energy consumption 
remains low at under 3 percent. Its importance, however, is growing. 
Similarly, China's nuclear power program only gained traction at the end of 
the 1990s, but the country now plans to increase nuclear power generation 
capacity by a factor of 4 to 5 over the next 15 years. The aim is to reduce 
China's dependence on coal, which generates greenhouse-gas emissions. 
Finally, the Chinese government is exploring ways to improve energy 
efficiency and to increase the use of renewable energy sources such as solar, 
wind, biomass, and hydroelectric power. 
China's energy vulnerabilities 
At present, China's energy system remains vulnerable in six major areas. 
First and foremost, the Chinese economy has been growing at spectacular 
rates for nearly three decades and is expected to enjoy high growth rates 
for at least the next 15 years. China will therefore have enormous energy 
requirements over the long-term. This rising energy use is causing a major 
vulnerability: a structural mismatch between energy resource availability 
and energy consumption. 
While increasing energy requirements are themselves challenging, an 
equally great challenge is determining the right energy mix. China needs 
clean, high-quality energy to support continued economic growth, but, despite 
the relative abundance of coal and other energy resources, China currently 
lacks high-quality premium fuels. For instance, the shares of natural gas and 
nuclear power are still very low in China's energy production. 
In addition, there are structural problems within individual energy 
sectors. In coal, for instance, upstream mining is well developed but 
investment is lacking in coal washing, shaping, transportation, distribution, 
and coal-water slurry. Similarly, in the power sector, power generation, 
transmission, and distribution are not well coordinated, leading to 
bottlenecks in many markets (Yan and Zhao 2003). 
Closely associated with the deep structural mismatch between energy 
needs and energy production is China's second energy vulnerability. It 
centers on the fact that China's per capita energy consumption is below the 
world average and far below the levels of developed countries. For instance, 
China's per capita primary energy consumption was only 15 percent of 
that in the United States during 2005. Low per capita energy consumption 
implies that as the Chinese economy develops, an increase in per capita 
energy consumption is inevitable. 
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AS-a result, the promotion of energy efficiency has taken on enormous 
importance in China. Already, China has applied various energy conser- 
vation technologies and achieved impressive results. The task, however, is 
becoming increasingly difficult (Xuan 2004). As a priority, China intends 
to establish a market-oriented policy framework and invest substantially in 
new energy technologies to further promote energy conservation. If China 
fails to effectively implement these conservation strategies, energy demand 
may rise to levels that are impossible to meet in the future. 
The third area of vulnerability is China's growing oil demand and the 
lack of domestic supply. In terms of energy security, oil supply security is 
the most important issue for China. While natural gas imports may add 
to the security problem, they may also be viewed as a way to mitigate the 
growing dependence on oil through energy diversification. 
The fourth energy vulnerability is the conflict between energy use and 
environmental protection. China is currently the world's largest sul- 
fur dioxide polluter and the second largest carbon dioxide emitter. In 
November 2006, the International Energy Agency predicted that the PRC 
would surpass the United States in 2009 as the biggest emitter of carbon 
dioxide (Quek 2006). Moreover, at the beginning of this decade about two- 
fifths of China's land territory was affected by acid rain, with the Lower 
Yangtze region the most heavily disturbed (Zhang 2002). 
Much of these problems can be traced back to China's reliance on coal to meet 
the bulk of its energy needs. The massive use of coal is causing serious problems 
with the environment and public health. At present, nearly 80 percent of coal 
is burned raw, either as a fuel or for power generation. Although the Chinese 
government has made great efforts to promote the use of clean and premium 
fuels, it is inevitable that coal will remain the primary source of energy. In fact, 
it will take decades before China is able to reduce coal to under 50 percent of 
total energy consumption and apply basic clean coal technologies. 
The fifth vulnerabilii is that for all energy sectors a well-functioning 
management and regulatory framework either does not exist or is incomplete. 
The Chinese government has tried for decades to address this problem. Reform 
of the coal, oil, and gas industries, for example, started as early as the mid-1980s. 
However, the coal sector remains beset with low efficiency, heavy pollution, rail- 
way congestion, and production safety issues, while in oil and gas, competitive 
markets are far from fUy established. Power sector reform, on the other hand, 
is relatively new, but also faces a major uphill battle in ending decades of 
monopoly. As of today, there is still a long way to go toward establishing 
regulatory frameworks that allocate energy accordiig to market-based systems. 
The last vulnerability is the inefficient supply of energy to China's vast 
rural areas. China currently has over 20 million people in rural areas who have 
no access to electricity. The massive use, often in primitive ways, of non- 
commercial biomass (mainly stalks and firewood) is ecologically destructive 
and economically inefficient. As a result, rural energy development has long 
been one of the foci of China's energy policy. The government has tried for 
decades to promote the commercialization of biomass use and extend the 
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electric power grid to remote areas. But the government continues to face 
enormous challenges. Even now 61 percent of China's total population, or 
over 780 million people, live outside of urban cities and towns. 
Among these vulnerabilities, the structural mismatch between energy 
production and consumption, as well as rising oil imports and their impact 
on energy security, are considered the most challenging. While China's total 
energy needs during the coming decades are problematic, the country's lack 
of clean, premium, and high-quality fuels is an even bigger predicament. 
Indeed, adequate supplies of clean and high quality energy could support 
the Chinese government's goals of fostering rapid economic growth while 
improving China's environmental and ecological conditions. However, to 
obtain sufficient clean, premium, and high-quality energy products, China 
not only has to substantially increase its investment in oil, gas, hydroelec- 
tricity, nuclear power, and clean coal technologies but also import more oil 
and gas. This will, in turn, increase the importance of energy security. 
Put differently, energy security will soon become the biggest energy 
vulnerability facing the PRC. If China feels that its energy security is 
jeopardized, many of the other policy goals such as the use of clean and 
high-quality fuels, environmental protection, and improving the efficiency 
of the energy sector through reform will be negatively affected. 
Deepening energy import dependence 
As represented in Figure 10.1, China became a net oil importer in 1993 following 
nearly 15 years of rapid economic growth. Currently, China is a net energy 
importer on an overall basis, mainly due to rising oil imports and shrinking coal 
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Figure 10.1 China's oil (crude and products) exports and imports, 1980-2005. 
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expoks. Moreover, China's coal exports are likely to decline further during the 
coming decades, while natural gas and oil imports will continue to grow. 
As the world's largest coal producer, China has long exported coal to 
Asia. However, the rapid rise of domestic coal demand since 2003 has 
threatened China's position as a large coal exporter. Coal imports have 
been on the rise, and, within the next five to ten years, China is likely to 
become a net coal importer. 
To diversify its sources of energy, China has rapidly developed its 
natural gas industry since the late 1990s. The pace of development has been 
particularly fast in recent years, as China's overall energy supply tightened. 
Spurred by high demand for energy, especially electric power, domestic 
natural gas pipelines have been built at a rapid pace. At the same time, 
one liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal for imports is up and running, 
another is under construction, and several more have been approved. 
China's current natural gas consumption is supplied almost entirely from 
domestic production, but future natural gas supplies are expected to come 
from three sources: higher domestic gas production; current and future 
LNG imports from Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East; 
and emerging imports of pipelined gas from neighboring countries to start 
at the earliest between 2010 and 2015 (Wu and Fesharaki 2005a). 
Finally, China's petroleum sector and oil markets are expected to 
change continuously over the next ten years and beyond. Crude production 
growth from within China is expected to be flat, yet demand for petroleum 
products is likely to grow strongly. As Figure 10.2 elucidates, this situation 
Figure 10.2 China's crude production and net oil import requirements, 1990-2015. 
will require continuously rising imports of oil over the long term. Most 
troubling is that over 70 percent of China's net imports are likely to come 
from the geopolitically unstable Middle East. 
Strategic policy proposals 
China's growing importance of energy security is therefore first and 
foremost a consequence of rising oil imports. In the future, the decline of 
coal exports and stagnant domestic oil production will add to this problem 
(Wu and Fesharaki 2005b). Evidently, oil supply security in particular and 
energy supply security in general has become one of the top concerns for 
the Chinese government since the beginning of the new millennium. 
This is reflected in recent government policy proposals. For the first time, 
two energy security items were incorporated in China's 10th Five-Year Plan 
(2001-2005) (Wu 2001). At the strategic level, the government set the goal 
to optimize the mix of energy while ensuring the country's overall energy 
security. Specifically for oil and gas, the plan contained the establishment 
of a strategic petroleum stockpile. This stockpile aims to ensure petroleum 
supply security and enhance the government's capacity to stabilize the 
market. 
Concern with energy security took a step further when in November 2004 
China's State Council approved the country's first "Mid- and Long-Term 
Energy Conservation Plan" (Hai 2005). In addition, the 11th Five-Year 
Program (2006-2010), where the term "plan" was replaced by "program," 
has made improving energy efficiency and conservation a top priority. The 
policy goals of the 10th Five-Year plan were expanded upon in this program, 
which mentions ensuring energy supply and managing energy demand, 
especially energy conservation, as enduring policy goals. Nonetheless, 
China still has a long way to go to before it can reach the ambitious targets 
contained in these policy documents. 
Overall, the past years have seen the formulation of a plethora of 
additional policy proposals by the Chinese government (Chen 2003; 
Qin 2004, Xu and Yang 2004). One central thrust is to adjust energy 
consumption and production structures so as to reduce China's dependence 
on oil. Encouraging coal gasification, liquefaction, and the development of 
nuclear power are the most common proposals in this respect. 
Another set of proposals is found in the realm of international relations, 
which will be discussed in detail in the next sections. A final set of proposals 
reflects clearly how China's energy production and distribution system 
remains dominated by state firms. Although subsidiaries of China's state 
oil giants have been listed on stock markets abroad and their corporate 
governance reformed, the process of reforming the state energy production 
and distribution systems remains ongoing. For example, there are calls to 
establish an oil futures market and to enhance the government's energy 
information gathering and research capabilities. There are also plans to 
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form-a centralized government agency for energy management and to draft 
a coherent national energy policy. 
State oil companies are also seen as tools for the government to secure 
energy resources. These companies, for instance, should seek to strengthen 
overseas investments, particularly in the Middle East, Asia Pacific, Russia, 
Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are also calls for China's 
state oil corporations to strategically cooperate with state shipping firms 
and to enhance government support for these shipping companies. The aim 
is to make ocean transportation of energy resources an important element 
of China's energy security. 
Despite this wealth of policy proposals, progress on many fronts remains 
difficult, especially deeper reforms of China's internal energy production 
and distribution markets. China thus continues to search for ways to form a 
comprehensive and effective energy security strategy on the economic front. 
Energy security, foreign policy, and national security 1 
Energy security is as much a political issue as an economic one, and 
therefore has important consequences for a country's foreign and defense 
policies. In China's case, the political ramifications of energy security are 
profound. Since at least the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party's 
(CCP) continued legitimacy has depended in large part on its ability to 
improve the economic welfare of the Chinese people, something it has been 
able to do with considerable success. Yet, energy security is a prerequisite 
for sustained economic growth and is therefore viewed by the ruling elite as 
critical to its long-term survival. 
The future of China's energy security has clearly become a source of some 
concern for China's political leaders. According to one Chinese analyst, 
the success or failure of China's modernization drive rests on the Chinese 
government's ability to achieve energy security (Friedberg 2006: 24). 
Indeed, the highest levels of the Chinese leadership have drawn attention 
to the country's energy security situation, resulting in the formation of 
the State Energy Leading Group, chaired by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
(Liu 2006: 4). And as a study by the policy research division of the CCP 
concluded: "The question of importing oil is not a pure economic issue, but 
more an issue involving international politics" (Tang 2006: 28). 
As analyzed in previous sections, one of the outcomes of China's capitalist 
transition has been the country's growing dependence on energy imports. 
This dependence can be mitigated in part through domestic initiatives 
such as enhancing energy self-sufficiency and harnessing renewable energy 
sources. However, such programs will take decades to bear fruit, and 
in any case it is virtually impossible for a country like China to become 
totally self-sufficient in energy resources. As a result, China's dependence 
on imported energy is set to become a permanent reality with important 
consequences for the conduct of Chinese foreign and defense policies. 
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In this sense, the PRC is simply following in the footsteps of other 
capitalist developers, and is becoming a more normal country. During the 
20th century, access to energy resources became a prime concern for major 
capitalist powers such as Britain, the United States, and Japan, exerting 
a strong influence on those countries' foreign and defense policies. In the 
early 20th century the Middle East assumed a new importance in Britain's 
foreign policy as the Royal Navy switched from coal to oil. Post-World 
War Two, the need to secure access to overseas oil fields became one of the 
central drivers of US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. 
More recently, the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 
may publicly have been justified by the need to destroy Saddam Hussein's 
alleged weapons of mass destruction program and also a desire to spread 
democracy in the Middle East. However, oil was certainly a major factor 
in these calculations. Access to oil has also been a critical component for 
resource-poor Japan's foreign and defense policies. Tokyo has thus pursued 
different means to obtain that end: from military expansionism in 1941 to 
diplomacy post-1 945. 
The following sections are divided into three parts. The first examines 
the influence of energy security on China's foreign policy, in particular on 
Beijing's increased interaction with resource-rich regions of the world. The 
second part focuses on how energy security is reshaping the parameters of 
the PRC's national security and defense policies, specifically the perceived 
need to reduce the country's strategic vulnerabilities. The final part then 
considers whether China's search for energy security will become a force for 
cooperation, competition, or possibly even confrontation with other powers 
such as America, Japan, India, and Russia. 
Energy security and Chinese foreign policy 
China's foreign policy may be said to consist of three interlinked core 
elements: great power diplomacy (daguo waijiao), good neighbor or 
peripheral diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao), and energy or resource diplomacy 
(nengyuan waijiao) (Tang 2006: 12). The first element centers primarily 
on the PRC's relations with the United States, followed by other major 
powers such as Japan, India, Russia, and the European Union. The aim 
of China's great power diplomacy has been to foster a stable international 
environment by avoiding confrontation. 
The second element is based on China's desire to foster close and 
cooperative relations with its neighbors, particularly those it shares borders 
with in Northeast, Southeast, and Central Asia. The resolution of border 
disputes and the development of transport linkages to bolster increased 
trade relations have been the main thrusts of this second element. 
The third element, energy diplomacy, is the newest of the three elements. 
and is aimed at securing energy and other natural resources to fuel China's 
modernization program. Since the dawn of the 21st century, energy 
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diplomacy has acquired an even greater prominence. The travel itineraries 
of PRC leaders increasingly include energy producing countries, and the 
bilateral agreements secured invariably involve commitments by China to 
purchase energy resources or invest in these countries' energy production. 
The most important geographical area for China's energy needs is the 
Middle East, which supplies nearly half of the country's crude oil imports. 
The two most important countries for China in this region are Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Over the past several years Sino-Saudi relations have grown 
closer, as Riyadh seeks to reduce its dependence on the United States, and 
Beijing's thirst for oil has increased. Today, Saudi Arabia provides China 
with about 17.5 percent of its crude oil imports, a figure that is set to rise 
over the coming decades (BBC News 2006). 
Iran is also a major producer of oil and gas, and the PRC is keen to 
increase imports of both. In March 2004 Beijing signed an agreement with 
Tehran to import 110 million tons of LNG for the next 25 years worth 
US$25 billion (Wall Street Journal 2004). This price tag can easily double 
if an actual contract is signed today. The PRC has also made a major 
investment in Iran's Yadavaran oil field (Washington Post 2004). 
While China may have no choice but to increase energy imports from the 
Middle East, it also seeks ways to manage if not reduce its overall depen- 
dence on this region for two reasons: first, this region is politically unstable, 
which could lead to supply disruptions; and second, Beijing is concerned 
about the strategic vulnerabilities associated with the transit of energy 
resources from the Middle East through geographical choke points such 
as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. The issue of strategic 
vulnerabilities will be explored in more detail later. What follows is a brief 
examination of China's attempts to reduce its dependence on the Middle 
East by securing energy resources in other parts of the world. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Beijing has looked to 
neighboring Kazakhstan in Central Asia and Russia as important sources 
of energy supplies. Both countries share a land border with China and oil 
imports can be received via oil pipelines or by rail. In the late 1990s, China 
entered into negotiations with Kazakhstan to construct an oil pipeline. 
However, it was not until 2004 that construction of the pipeline actually 
began. Completed in late 2005, the US$700 million, 960-kilometer pipeline 
from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to Xinjiang Province in China is capable 
of delivering 10 million tons of oil every year, rising to 15 million tons 
by 2010, and up to 50 million tons over the long term (Asia Times 2005a; 
People's Daily 2004a). 
China has also worked hard to cultivate close relations with other Central 
Asian Republics and has been the driving force behind the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). This organization links Central Asian 
Republics to China and Russia. For China, one of its main agenda items 
has been to secure Chinese access to regional energy resources. 
One of China's top priorities in its relations with Russia has been tapping 
into that country's vast energy resources. Russia is the world's largest 
producer of crude oil, and is already an important supplier to China. Over 
the past decade Beijing has been trying to gain access to Russia's massive 
oil reserves located in eastern Siberia, an effort that has brought it into 
direct competition with Japan. Tokyo imports 80 percent of its oil from the 
Middle East, and, like China, is trying to lessen its dependence on that part 
of the world. Japan and China have competed with each other to build rival 
pipelines to transport the Siberian oil. Japan prodded Moscow to accept a 
route from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to the Pacific port of Nakhodka; the 
oil would then be transported to Japan by sea. As a sweetener to the deal, 
Tokyo offered to finance construction of the proposed pipeline, estimated 
at US$13-15 billion. 
In opposition, China lobbied Russia to build a pipeline from Angarsk 
to the northeastern Chinese city of Daqing (Economist 2003). In order to 
extract maximum concessions, Moscow skillfully played the two sides off 
each other. In late 2004 Japan seemed confident that it had won the race. 
However, in April 2005 Moscow announced that the first stage of the oil 
pipeline would begin in Taishet, not Angarsk, and terminate mid-way at 
Skovorodino where oil would be shipped to China by rail (Moscow Times 
2005). Although Moscow has indicated that the pipeline would eventu- 
ally terminate at Nakhodka on Russia's Pacific coast, Tokyo was piqued 
by comments from Russian officials that China had priority over Japan, 
and threatened to withdraw its offer to finance the project (Japan Times 
2005). It seems likely, therefore, that Japan has lost out and that China will 
purchase the bulk of Russia's Siberian oil. 
China is also looking much further afield in its search for energy resources, 
including Africa and South America. Beijing has had interests in Africa 
since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. From the 1950s until the late 
1WOs these were primarily ideological: at the time, Beijing portrayed itself 
as the leader of the Third World and sponsored a number of revolutionary 
movements on the continent. During the 1980s and 1990s, China's interest in 
Africa waned as the country focused on economic development and relations 
with its Asian neighbors. Over the past few years, however, Africa has again 
become an area of intense interest for China, and oil has helped rekindle that 
interest. China has signed oil exploration or production agreements with the 
Sudan, Niger, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gabon, and Algeria, and is pursuing nego- 
tiations with Chad, Angola, and Congo over similar deals. 
African countries now supply approximately 25 percent of China's oil 
imports (Hill 2004). However, it is important to note that China is expanding 
its presence in Africa for reasons other than energy resources. Africa 
represents a potentially large market for Chinese manufactured goods and 
constitutes a community of 53 countries able to extend diplomatic support 
to China at the United Nations and other multilateral forums, thus denying 
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Taiwan international space (Thompson 2004). China's sponsorship of the 
China-Africa Summit in Beijing in November 2006, attended by heads of 
state from 48 African countries, highlighted Africa's growing importance 
in Chinese foreign policy. 
Finally, China's energy diplomacy extends to South America. Over the 
past few years Beijing has stepped up relations with Venezuela, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Argentina, Peru, and Cuba. In particular, China has courted 
Venezuela, one of the world's leading oil producers. Although Venezuela 
provides the United States with 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, Hugo 
Chavez has pursued an anti-American agenda since becoming president in 
1998 (BBC News 2005). As US-Venezuela ties have chilled, Sino-Venezuelan 
relations have warmed. The backbone of this new relationship is oil: 
Chavez wants to reduce dependence on oil exports to the United States, 
while China wants to increase energy imports from Venezuela. However, 
like Africa, oil is only one factor in China's South America policy. Beijing 
sees South America as an important market for Chinese goods, as well as 
another significant diplomatic community of 14 countries. 
Energy security and China's national security 
China's growing dependence on energy imports has aroused strategic 
anxieties within the government and among the country's security analysts. 
The focus of this anxiety is the perceived vulnerability of seabome energy 
imports. At present, China's navy is incapable of protecting the country's 
sea lines of communication (SLOC), the maritime arteries which enable 
ships to bring resources into the country and carry them out into the global 
market. Since the end of World War Two, the United States Navy has ensured 
freedom of navigation and kept the SLOCs open for international trade. 
America's global naval preponderance is a double-edged sword for 
China. On the one hand, it enables China to thrive as a maritime trading 
power. On the other hand, Chinese security analysts fear that in the event 
of heightened tensions with America, say over Taiwan, the US Navy would 
be able to blockade Chinese ports and interdict vessels heading for China 
on the high seas with impunity. The disruption of seaborne energy supplies 
to the PRC would have two effects: first, it would severely hinder China's 
ability to prosecute a war; and second, the country's economic growth 
would be negatively impacted, if not derailed. 
Emblematic of China's concern is the Strait of Malacca (SOM). Located 
in Southeast Asia, the SOM is a narrow and congested waterway separating 
Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern entrance. 
As the shortest route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the SOM is 
one of the world's most important waterways: 65,000 vessels transit through 
it each year, carrying over one-third of global commerce and half of global 
energy supplies. As the Chinese economy continues to boom, the SOM's 
strategic significance for China increases each year. 
As noted earlier, half of China's crude oil imports originate in the Middle 
East, with this figure expected to rise to 65 percent by 2015. Energy resources 
from the Middle East, plus those from Africa, are shipped to Chinese ports 
via the SOM, or the Lambok-Makassar Strait further to the east in Indonesia. 
The Chinese government increasingly views the country's reliance on these 
maritime choke points, especially the SOM, as a strategic vulnerability. 
In late 2003 President Hu Jintao expressed concern at China's energy 
security situation, noting that "certain major powers" (a codeword for the 
United States) were trying to control the strait (Wen Wei Po 2004). China's 
state-run media soon dubbed the issue China's "Malacca dilemma." As 
one commentary put it, "It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls 
the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route 
of China" (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 2004). In fact, Chinese analysts have 
accused the United States, Japan, and India of using transnational threats 
(especially piracy) in the area as a pretext to bolster their regional naval 
forces. According to Lu Guoxue, Washington's intention is to curtail 
China's rising power by restricting its access to energy supplies through the 
SOM (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 2004). 
China's first line of defense to protect its SLOCs and ensure uninterrupted 
supplies of energy is the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Over the past 
decade, the operational capabilities of the PLAN have improved significantly 
due to a combination of acquisitions of high-technology naval platforms from 
abroad (mainly Russia) and an active indigenous construction program. These 
have equipped the PLAN with new and sophisticated destroyers, frigates, 
amphibious landing ships, and submarines (Goldstein and Murray 2004). 
The primary driver for China's naval modernization has been potential 
contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, particularly the need to conduct 
amphibious landings and deter the US Navy from intervening in the 
dispute (Cole 2006). The surface vessels and submarines now in the PLAN'S 
inventory also enable China to exert limited control over its SLOCs, 
particularly those close to the Chinese coast. However, while China has 
made some progress toward establishing a blue-water navy, that is, an 
ocean-going navy, it is still several decades away from realizing that goal. 
As a blue-water navy might not be achieved for a generation, Chinese 
security planners have begun considering other ways to reduce the coun- 
try's "Malacca dilemma." One suggested strategy is to establish a Chinese 
naval presence, either temporarily in times of crisis or permanently as the 
PLAN expands, at ports in countries friendly to the PRC. This would obvi- 
ate the need for Chinese navy vessels to operate far from home. This "string 
of pearls" strategy includes ports in Cambodia, Burma, Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan (Washington Times 2005). Such a strategy would be dependent on 
China maintaining close relations with those countries, and might run the 
risk of fueling regional suspicions of China's intentions. 
Other proposals call for China to bypass the SOM altogether. All of these 
proposals involve significant financial outlays, technical difficulties, and 
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security concerns. One of the most fanciful proposals has been for China 
to finance construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in southern 
Thailand. The idea of an "Asian Panama Canal" has been around since 
the late 17th century, and was most recently revisited in 2001 by Thailand's 
Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Initially, the project 
aroused some interest in China, but Beijing baulked at the US$25 billion 
price tag. In 2003 Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra effectively 
killed the project in favor of a cheaper oil pipeline across the south of the 
country. Again China expressed an interest, but its enthusiasm waned due 
to cost concerns and escalating political violence in Thailand's southern 
provinces (Nation 2005). Moreover, neither the Kra Canal nor the energy 
pipeline would lessen China's sense of vulnerability. Tankers would still 
have set sail to and from Thailand, only shifting the geographical focus of 
the problem slightly (Storey 2006). 
Two other proposals involve the construction of energy pipelines to the 
PRC, much like the Kazakh-China pipeline outlined earlier. The first is 
a US$2 billion 750-mile pipeline from Sittwe in Burma to Kunming in 
China's Yunnan Province. This project is appealing to China because oil 
tankers carrying energy supplies from the Middle East and Africa would be 
able to sail directly to Sittwe, bypassing the SOM (Cheong 2004). The two 
countries reportedly began talks on the financing and construction of this 
pipeline in 2004 (Beng 2004). 
The second proposal is to build a pipeline from the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar to Xinjiang Province, Pakistan is a close ally of the PRC and 
Gwadar, partly financed by China, is very close to the Persian Gulf. Ships 
carrying energy supplies to China would be able to bypass all maritime 
choke points except the Strait of Hormuz. However, the China-Pakistan 
Energy Corridor, as the project has been dubbed, would be an expensive 
proposition given the long distances involved and the rugged terrain. The 
pipeline would also have to run through Baluchistan Province, which is 
prone to separatist violence. 
Increasingly those who frame China's national security and defense 
policies have to consider strategies to reduce the country's energy import 
dependence. These strategies include achieving blue-water status for the 
PLAN and constructing pipelines that bypass the SOM and other maritime 
choke points. However, all strategic options are expensive, time-consuming, 
and politically problematic. In the meantime, China will have to contend 
with the dilemmas and insecurities posed by its dependence on the maritime 
security and control over international waters exerted by the US Navy. 
Energy security and great power relstiolts 
As China's energy dependence deepens and Beijing looks to secure access 
to energy resources across the globe, security analysts and scholars of 
international relations have begun to consider the possible effects on 
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China's relations with other major powers, particularly the United States: 
Japan, and India. One such scholar, Aaron Friedberg (2006), has posited 
three possible scenarios. First, that energy security concerns will act as 
a catalyst for great power cooperation, especially in US-China relations. 
Second, that resource scarcity could lead China to adopt a more aggressive 
foreign policy, in which military force is used to secure energy resources. 
The final scenario lies somewhere in between: that "concern over access to 
resources will continue to act as a constraint on China's external behavior 
and an inducement for avoiding conflict with the United States" (Friedberg 
2006: 32-34). 
Based on current trends, it seems likely that for the foreseeable future 
China's efforts to achieve energy security will engender both cooperation 
and competition with other major powers. While the second scenario can- 
not be dismissed, it would be counterproductive to the PRC at this stage of 
its development. 
There is no doubt that China's search for energy security has created some 
friction with other global powers. Tensions have arisen between China and 
Japan, for instance, over access to energy resources in the East China Sea. 
Since 2003, Chinese rigs have been drilling for natural gas near the median 
line between the PRC and Japan in the East China Sea. Japan has called 
on China to desist because it believes Chinese rigs are exploiting gas on the 
Japanese side of the median line (Asia Times 2005b). Talks between the two 
countries have thus far failed to resolve the dispute, and both sides have 
stationed warships in the area. The potential for a naval clash has aroused 
concern in both countries, as well as in the United States. China's People's 
Daily (2004b) has described the competition for Russia's Siberian oil and 
the East China Sea dispute as "only a prelude of the game between China 
and Japan in the arena of international energy." 
However, it should be noted that competition for energy resources is one 
of a number of factors that have created strains in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians, the treatment 
of World War Two in Japanese school textbooks, the tightening of the 
US-Japan alliance and the implications for conflict over Taiwan, and the 
PRC's military modernization have also put strains on the relationship. 
Indeed, competition for energy resources is unlikely to spark a Sino- 
Japanese conflict, with both sides keen to protect annual bilateral trade of 
US$200 billion. 
China's expanding overseas energy interests have also brought it into 
contention with the United States. Voices in Washington have been critical 
of China's relations with countries such as the Sudan, Iran, Burma, and 
Venezuela, either because of those countries' poor human rights records 
or because they have adopted policies or positions perceived as inimical 
to US interests. In all of these countries China has important and growing 
energy interests. In the Sudan, for example, China's state-run oil companies 
have been investing heavily in oil production and refining facilities since 
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the late 1990s, and today China buys 50 percent of the country's output 
(Hill 2004). US oil companies have been prevented from investing in 
the Sudan since 1997 because of Khartoum's poor human rights record. 
Human rights groups have accused China of providing diplomatic support 
for Sudan at the United Nations in order to protect oil interests. 
China's ties to Iran have also raised America's ire. As noted earlier, Iran 
has become an important energy supplier to China. The United States 
has discouraged other countries (including Japan) from investing in Iran's 
energy industry, and instead called on the international community to 
impose punitive sanctions on Tehran because of its alleged development 
of nuclear weapons. China has opposed a sanctions regime against Iran, 
preferring diplomacy. However, China has avoided rupturing relations with 
America over Iran by agreeing to discuss the issue at the United Nations. 
China's actions underscore the fact that in the hierarchy of foreign policy 
priorities, "great power diplomacy" trumps "energy diplomacy." 
Energy security concerns have also led to other problems between China 
and the US. China's growing presence in South America has created 
some anxiety in the US that Beijing is attempting to challenge America's 
preeminent position in its own backyard (Thompson 2005). In terms of 
competition for energy resources, a troubling precursor of things to come 
might be the failed bid to purchase the US oil company Unocal Corp by 
state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in August 
2005. After several months in the media spotlight, CNOOC dropped its bid 
in the face of sustained opposition from US lawmakers who objected to the 
sale on national security grounds. 
China's bid for energy security has also engendered cooperation between 
the PRC and other countries. While Indian companies have lost out to their 
Chinese rivals in securing access to energy resources in countries such as 
Nigeria and Kazakhstan, energy companies from the two countries have 
actually joined forces in the Sudan and Syria. There is a growing realization 
in both Beijing and New Delhi that cooperation is more desirable than 
competition. As India's former Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar stated 
in January 2006: "We must set the stage for India and China to cooperate 
where possible and compete where necessary, without any of this having 
any political, diplomatic, or military implications" (Financial Express 
2006). In the same month, India and China signed a series of agreements 
designed to increase cooperation between their respective state-owned 
energy corporations (International Herald Tribune 2006). 
Perhaps the most encouraging example to date is the March 2005 
Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), signed between China, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam to explore for oil and gas in the disputed waters 
of the South China Sea.2 One of the primary drivers of the JMSU was 
rising global oil prices, and the agreement suggests that energy security 
concerns have created the political will to shelve the sovereignty dispute 
and engage in joint exploitation. However, whether the JMSU is set to 
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become a model for energy security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region 
remains to be seen. 
In sum, while energy security concerns have influenced China's foreign, 
defense, and national security policies, they have not transformed them. The 
PRC's number one priority will continue to be stability in the international 
system, a prerequisite for China's continued economic growth. 
Conclusion 
China's capitalist transition has resulted in the PRC's transformation from 
an energy exporting nation to a major energy consumer and importer. As 
a consequence, energy security issues have risen to the top of the Chinese 
government's agenda. The survival of the CCP depends in large part on its 
ability to sustain economic growth, which in turn rests on continued access 
to energy resources, both at home and abroad. 
Domestically, the Chinese government has continued to promote reform 
of the country's energy markets and state energy firms. To manage 
China's growing dependence on imported oil, the government is actively 
pursuing alternative sources of energy generation, including nuclear power, 
hydroelectricity, and renewable energy resources. China is also looking 
to increase energy efficiency and conservation, two areas in which it lags 
behind the rest of the world. China's continued dependence on coal, though, 
will continue to pose major challenges for the country's environment, as 
well as the global community at large. 
The impacts of energy security on China's international relations are 
multiple. China's energy import dependence has the potential to engender 
either greater cooperation or competition with other powers. For now, 
energy security has become one of the three core elements of Chinese 
foreign policy. Chinese leaders currently emphasize access to foreign energy 
resources, along with expanded trade and investment ties. As a result, 
China's interests are becoming increasingly global, albeit across a narrow 
range of concerns. 
Energy security has also become an important factor in the PRC's 
national security and defense policies. Although Taiwan drives China's 
military modernization program, anxiety over the vulnerability of seaborne 
energy imports is focusing attention on the need to increase China's naval 
power, since a blue-water navy would enable China to secure its maritime 
trade routes. However, this will be a long-term process, and in the meantime 
China is studying means to reduce its vulnerabilities by trying to bypass 
maritime choke points. 
It is important to bear in mind that energy security has not fundamentally 
altered China's foreign and defense policies. The central aim of Chinese 
foreign policy continues to be the maintenance of a stable international 
system. China may be competing for energy resources with other countries, 
but this competition is unlikely to lead to direct confrontation. Similarly, 
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energy security concerns have not led the PRC to drastically increase its 
defense expenditure. 
In the end, economic factors triggered by China's capitalist transition 
will continue to deepen China's energy import dependence, increasing 
the prominence of energy security in Chinese policy-making. Successfully 
assuring energy security, in turn, will depend in large part on whether 
China can manage its geopolitical environment and avoid confrontation 
over energy resources. It will also hinge on whether China's energy 
production and distribution system can be reformed to avoid ecological 
degradation and disasters. 
While not all signs are clear, Chinese leaders' emphasis on energy 
security seems to be prodding some cooperative and even multilateral 
initiatives. One thing is for sure, China's rapidly deepening energy import 
dependence will integrate China further with the rest of the world. The 
process of assuring energy security will thus constitute a key force shaping 
the international ramifications of China's capitalist transition. 
Notes 
1 Primary commercial energy is defined as including coal, o i l  natural gas, 
hydroelectricity, and nuclear power only. 
2 For more details on the JMSU see Schofield and Storey (2005). 
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